

SECRET

25X1

25X1

The Director of Central Intelligence  
Washington, D.C. 20505

NIC #01833-85  
5 April 1985

National Intelligence Council

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

FROM: Frederick L. Wetters *FLW*  
National Intelligence Officer for Africa

SUBJECT: Angola: US Strategy and Comments on the Paper  
"Impact of Alternative Regional Settlements"

REFERENCE: Memo for NIO/AF from DCI, dtd 3 Apr 85,  
Subject: Angola: Impact of Alternative  
Regional Settlements

1. The paper "Angola: Impact of Alternative Regional Settlements" which you forwarded to me for comment is the standard State recitation on Angola. Although the paper is by and large factually accurate, I find it overall a useless and unfixable document.

2. The paper correctly suggests that three of the four "strategies" posited are not feasible--a judgment in which I heartily concur. I also would argue that the fourth "strategy"--some form of UNITA-MPLA reconciliation--is wishful thinking and unattainable. In my judgment the lack of political and military realism reflected in the paper undercuts its value. Just as importantly, the paper fails to address core strategic US interests or suggest how we best can get from here to there.

3. I draw your attention to what I believe are errors of fact and interpretation in the original paper--which I assume came from State. The paper in its "current scene" analysis overstates the interest in reconciliation within the MPLA leadership. The "reliable sources" primarily are MPLA interlocutors speaking to State officers. These statements must be regarded with suspicion. Both MPLA public and private conduct, as well as intelligence reporting, points to the lack of support at senior MPLA levels for any genuine power-sharing or reconciliation with UNITA. There is some evidence to suggest that the statements to State in fact are disinformation (the Zambians, for example, have so concluded). This error is multiplied in the fourth "strategy" where the paper suggests the possibility of a reconciliation even though admitting serious

1

SECRET

CL BY SIGNER  
DECL OADR

DCI  
EXEC  
REG

25X1

25X1

SECRET [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]25X1  
25X1

problems. I think more needs be said about the problems. For example, the paper makes no allusion to the 1975 coalition between MPLA and UNITA which ended in July 1975, with an MPLA campaign of massacre and assassination of all UNITA cadres in reach. This experience certainly constrains any UNITA participation in any future coalition with the MPLA. None of the scenarios mention UNITA and MPLA suspicion of and outright hostility to American or other outside-proposed solutions, yet evidence of this exists. Finally, the original paper suggests that the MPLA-UNITA deadlock is a permanent feature. Neither I nor DDI nor DIA analysts believe this to be the case. In the recent IA "Angola's Civil War: Outlook for 1985," the DDI foresaw the very real possibility that continuing pressure by UNITA will eventually break the MPLA, producing a dramatic MPLA collapse--albeit admitting that such an outcome is more than a year away (relevant two paragraphs attached as Tab B).

4. Given the serious deficiencies in this paper, I have drafted what I consider to be a more useful examination of US interests and discuss how these interests would be affected under four scenarios. As such, I judge which scenario best serves US end-game interests (UNITA victory), examine current US policies and suggest policy adjustments that would facilitate the desired outcome.

5. In sum, I do not believe the original State paper is fixable or helpful to policymakers since none of the strategies are reasonably attainable. I offer my paper, attached, as a different way to analyze the same policy problem.

  
Frederick L. Wettering

Attachments: Tabs A and B

[REDACTED]  
SECRET [REDACTED]25X1  
25X1

ATTACHMENT

*Tab A*

Form 163a  
8-66

SECRET 

25X1

5 April 1985

## I. US END-GAME INTERESTS IN ANGOLA

It is vital to articulate the core US strategic interests--referred to here as "end-game interests"--that we wish to see served in Angola. US diplomatic as well as other efforts can then be better geared to ensuring that these interests are attained.

Our end-game interests can be summarized as follows:

- Ending the civil war in Angola and thus eliminating the justification for Soviet and Cuban military presence and influence in Angola.
- Creating a situation to force the removal of the Cuban military expeditionary force from Angola, thereby invalidating the belief that such intervention is an effective technique of Soviet Bloc power projection.
- Reducing Soviet influence with whatever government exists in Angola and eliminating Soviet military air and naval use of port and harbor facilities at Luanda, Lobito, and Namibe which threaten US control of the South-Central Atlantic and facilitate Soviet military power projection from the West Coast of Africa to Cuba and within Africa.
- Limiting Soviet-Cuban opportunities for politically and militarily influencing developments in neighboring states, especially Namibia.
- Limiting opportunities for armed confrontations between South African and Soviet-Cuban military forces in Angola--confrontations which could escalate to a point where they weaken South Africa or become a serious global issue between the US and USSR.

## II. LIKELY END-GAME SCENARIOS

The critical factor in achieving these interests is the coming to power of a regime in Luanda capable of reducing or eliminating the Soviet and Cuban military presence. At the same time, this regime must be able to conclude effectively the MPLA-UNITA civil war. The key question then becomes: what regime is best equipped to carry out these tasks? Four scenarios--ranging from least to most likely--are presented below.

SECRET 

25X1

SECRET

25X1

Scenario 1: MPLA-UNITA power-sharing in a coalition government.

There are no precedents in Africa for genuine or longlasting power-sharing arrangements between two rival political forces. Although UNITA leader Savimbi has paid some lip service to the possibility of such a coalition, other UNITA officials openly point to the January-July 1975 power-sharing arrangement between MPLA and UNITA under the Alvor Accord. This effort ended with MPLA forces suddenly and treacherously moving against UNITA elements, murdering those caught and driving the remainder into opposition in the bush. MPLA leaders--for their part--have shown a pathological fear of Savimbi; MPLA objections to elections in 1974-1975 reflected their fear of Savimbi's popularity even among their own rank and file. No MPLA senior leader has evinced strong support for genuine reconciliation, although at least one has ruminated on the possibility of using reconciliation talks to entrap and murder senior UNITA leaders. The conclusion is almost inescapable that prospects for a genuine reconciliation and power-sharing are so remote as to make this scenario extremely unlikely.

Scenario 2: Partition, either de facto or de jure between MPLA and UNITA.

There is little evidence to suggest partition is being seriously proposed. Third World and African states--citing the examples of Biafra and Katanga--would vigorously oppose such a solution especially since South Africa would be the only party to directly benefit from division. Any de facto partition or "ceasefire in place" almost certainly would be seen by one or both principal parties as a tactical breathing space to be used to re-equip and rearm for further struggle. Neither the MPLA nor UNITA is likely to abandon for long their national ambitions and accept "half a loaf." While such a scenario probably could be hammered out with difficulty, it would not provide a durable solution.

Scenario 3: MPLA victory over UNITA, including absorption of elements of UNITA (but probably not its leadership).

There are elements of the MPLA leadership which have indicated dissatisfaction with the Cuban presence and could conceivably dismiss most of the Cuban troops in the wake of an MPLA suppression of UNITA. Such an outcome, however, would change the circumstances of a Cuban withdrawal from ignominious exit to victorious withdrawal. Moreover, it is unlikely that the paranoid vanguard MPLA leadership would dispense entirely with the Cuban military presence (witness Ethiopia). It also is most unlikely that such a regime would restrict significantly Soviet presence and influence. Militarily such a scenario is conceivable but it would require a long time frame--several years--as well as an increasingly active and aggressive role by Cuban and other forces. It also would require a lessening or elimination of South African and other

SECRET

25X1

SECRET

25X1

outside support to UNITA. It is difficult to see how such an outcome serves US end-game interests.

Scenario 4: UNITA victory over MPLA, including absorption of some elements of MPLA (but probably not its leadership).

A victorious UNITA regime almost certainly would move to quickly remove Cuban troops and restrict the Soviet presence and influence. This clearly serves all US end-game interests. Moreover, such a scenario is militarily conceivable, though obviously not without difficulties. It would require an accelerated Cuban reluctance to engage in combat and the withdrawal of Cuban troops to enclaves. It also would require the defection of significant elements of the MPLA military and possibly elements of the MPLA political apparatus to UNITA's side. Increased external support from South African and other sources also would be required. As with Scenario 3, such an outcome will require several years, although a rapid MPLA collapse--ala the South Vietnam government--cannot be ruled out.

### III. US STRATEGY

To best achieve US interests, our strategy should be directed toward ensuring the evolution of Scenario 4--a UNITA victory. Given legal constraints (Clark Amendment) as well as probable lack of Congressional and popular support for a direct US role in supporting UNITA, our ability to influence the situation is limited. Even excluding direct military or covert engagement, however, other avenues--some of which already are being pursued--are open to us. These include:

- Encouraging South Africa, France, Zaire and other suppliers and supporters of UNITA to expand their materiel, political and diplomatic support.
- Manipulating US contacts with the MPLA regime to magnify factionalism by weakening the pro-Soviet elements and encouraging factions which could be "reconciled" (in effect absorbed by UNITA). This also would involve encouraging anti-Cuban and anti-Soviet attitudes. This manipulation obviously must be done subtly so that the US is not perceived as openly working against the MPLA.
- Discouraging Western investment which provides hard currency to the MPLA regime, much of which is used to pay the Soviets and Cubans for their support and presence.
- Discouraging the supply by Western sources of economic aid and military and military-related materiel to the MPLA regime.

SECRET

25X1

SECRET 

25X1

- Facilitating expanded UNITA contacts with conservative and moderate foreign governments and forces which could provide increased political, diplomatic, and military support to UNITA.
- Facilitating the increase of pro-UNITA, anti-Cuban and anti-MPLA propaganda to weaken Cuban and MPLA resolve and increase UNITA's legitimacy.

#### IV. CONCLUSION

The USG, in fact, currently is pursuing elements of all of the above proposed steps, although with differing amounts of intensity and consistency and without a clear conception of strategic purpose. The proposed strategy does not call for new or dramatic departures from current policies, but rather renewed emphasis and enthusiasm in acting along existing lines. Given the foregoing analysis, we should not be disheartened if diplomacy fails to attain an unreachable goal such as MPLA-UNITA reconciliation.

What is needed is the shared vision that US interests are attainable, that the basic elements of an appropriate policy already are in place, and that patience and perseverance with these policies can have a pay off.

As evidence that the framework of current US Angola policies is working towards the desired end-game, one only has to look at a map of Angola. Since 1981, UNITA fortunes have flowered. UNITA has expanded its area of operations from one-fourth of the country to the entire country. South African, French, Zairian and other support has increased. The costs to the Soviets and Cubans have increased, and there is evidence that the Cuban will to remain engaged may be flagging. Overall, the MPLA has been weakened by the emergence of yet more factions, including what appears to be a putative peace faction and a black nationalist faction that could be absorbed by UNITA. The current military stalemate could very conceivably be ended, not by any single dramatic military action, but by gradually mounting pressure by UNITA until the MPLA loses the will to continue the conflict. At such a point, MPLA collapse could be rapid and dramatic.

SECRET 

25X1

ATTACHMENT

*Tab B*

Form 163a  
8-66



**Page Denied**

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied

# EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT

## ROUTING SLIP

TO:

		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		X		
2	DDCI		X		
3	EXDIR				
4	D/ICS				
5	DDI		X		
6	DDA				
7	DDO		X		
8	DDS&T				
9	Chm/NIC				
10	GC				
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	D/Pers				
14	D/OLL				
15	D/PAO				
16	SA/IA				
17	AO/DCI				
18	C/IPD/OIS				
19	NIO/AF		X		
20	VC/NIC	X			
21	C/AF/DO		X		
22	ER				
SUSPENSE		Date			

Remarks

25X1

Executive Secretary

3 Apr 85

Date

3637 (10-81)

EXECUTIVE REGISTRY


85- 1449

3 April 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: National Intelligence Officer for Africa  
FROM: Director of Central Intelligence  
SUBJECT: Angola: Impact of Alternative Regional Settlements

Take a look at this paper and see how you can improve it, reflecting recent reporting, particularly Mobutu's and Zavimbi's apparent attitudes that Crocker may be leading them down a garden path. This came out quite clearly in a discussion that [ ] and I had with Ambassador Grove yesterday morning.

25X1

  
William J. Casey

cc: [ ]

25X1

SECRET



25X1

C301

**Page Denied**

Next 6 Page(s) In Document Denied